Yesterday, visitors to some of the most trusted websites in the world, the BBC, CNN, Zoom, HSBC, Salesforce, IKEA, were quietly served malware. None of those organizations had been hacked in the usual sense. Their servers were fine. Their passwords were fine. What changed was a few lines inside a script they all load from the same vendor, Optimizely, whose Web Experimentation product is used to run A/B tests on pages. An attacker found a way to write code into customers' projects, and that code rode out to every visitor on Optimizely's own content delivery network (CDN), with a trusted domain and a valid certificate.

This post explains what happened in plain English, what it did to the people who visited those sites, and then turns to the part that matters for anyone who manages a website of any size: the same exposure exists on your site, through whichever third-party scripts you happen to load, and you can reduce it this week.

What happened, as far as anyone knows

The clearest account so far comes from Report URI, the security monitoring company run by researcher Scott Helme, which swept 1,611 Optimizely snippets on the evening of November 16 and found 188 of them infected, belonging to 178 organizations. The first known injection appeared in the BBC's snippet at 4:21 UTC. Over the day the attacker rebuilt the payload 26 times, adding a payment-card skimmer in the early afternoon. Most affected snippets were cleaned by about 9:00 PM UTC.

The mechanism was simple. Optimizely projects have a field called Project JavaScript, where a customer can add their own code to run alongside experiments. The attacker wrote into that field. Everything else in each snippet was untouched, which is why this was not a hijacked CDN or a poisoned cache. Optimizely's CDN faithfully served what it had been given.

Optimizely's status update says an unauthorized party "exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" and "used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects," and that it has "fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code from affected projects," secured affected accounts, revoked tokens, and notified customers. The Register reports the flaw was in the sign-up process for the experimentation product, under the name OPTIMJACK; Report URI's own write-up is careful to say the entry method is not yet confirmed and asks Optimizely to explain it. Expect that detail to firm up over the next few days.

What the code did to visitors

Three things, according to the Report URI analysis, each aimed at a different kind of visitor.

For anyone dealing in cryptocurrency, the script was a clipper: it watched the page, the clipboard, and outgoing requests for wallet addresses and swapped them for the attacker's. By that evening the attacker's wallets had collected roughly $7,000, a modest sum that says more about how quickly it was caught than about the ambition behind it.

For anyone typing a card number into a form on an affected page, the afternoon update added a skimmer that captured the card number, expiry, and security code and sent them to a domain registered that same morning. Hosted payment frames, the kind where the card fields are served by the payment processor rather than the page itself, were not affected. That distinction is worth a sentence in your own notes.

For iPhone users on older software, the script loaded hidden frames carrying two exploit kits, known as Coruna and DarkSword, that target iOS 13 through 18. Apple's current releases (18.7.3 and 26.3 or later, per the analysis) are patched. The script also collected page URLs, cookies not marked HttpOnly, and screenshots of the page.

Why this is your problem too

You almost certainly do not use Optimizely. Most of the people reading this run a site on WordPress, Squarespace, Shopify, or Wix, with a handful of extras bolted on: Google Analytics, a chat widget, a reviews badge, a form tool, a heat-map tracker, the Facebook pixel, a font service, a cookie banner. Each of those is a <script> tag that tells every visitor's browser to download and run code from someone else's server, with the same access to the page that your own code has. It can read what the visitor types. It can change what the visitor sees. It can send either one anywhere.

That is not a flaw to be fixed. It is how the web works, and it is the deal you make every time you paste an embed code. The Optimizely incident is simply the clearest recent demonstration that the deal has a cost, and that the cost lands on your visitors, through your site, without anyone touching your server. Chapter 8 of the book makes the point in a sentence: your security is the security of everything you have chosen to trust. The choosing is the part you control.

The audit, this week

Protect thirty minutes. This is a one-time inventory that joins your maintenance calendar as a quarterly review afterward.

  1. List every third-party script. Open your homepage, your contact page, and your checkout or donation page in a browser, open the developer tools (View, Developer, or press F12), and look at the Network panel filtered to JS. Every domain that is not yours is a vendor. If you use a tag manager, open it and list every tag in it too; tag managers are where forgotten scripts go to live forever.

  2. Name the owner and the reason for each one. A script nobody can explain is a script to remove. In my experience the list usually contains at least one tool from a campaign that ended two years ago.

  3. Remove what you no longer use. Fewer scripts is fewer vendors who can have a day like Optimizely just had. This is the single highest-value step and it costs nothing.

  4. Check how your payment fields work. If your checkout or donation form uses a hosted frame from Stripe, PayPal, Square, or your donation platform, card details never touch your page's scripts. If the fields are rendered by your own page, ask your developer or platform whether a hosted frame is available. It was the difference yesterday.

  5. Write down the vendor contacts. For each remaining script: the vendor, the account owner, where the status page is, and how to remove the tag in a hurry. This is the same Emergency Contact Card the Web Emergency Playbook builds; a compromised script is one more entry on it.

  6. Ask about a Content Security Policy. A Content Security Policy (CSP) is a header your site sends that tells browsers which domains are allowed to run code and receive data. Report URI's crawl of affected sites found that of the organizations with a policy, only about one in four had one strict enough to block the payload, and most had none at all. A CSP is a developer task, not a weekend task for an accidental web manager, but it is a reasonable question to put to whoever maintains your site, and the answer tells you something about them.

Done looks like a dated list of every third-party script on your site with an owner and a reason beside each one, at least one removed, your payment fields confirmed as hosted or flagged for a conversation, and vendor contacts added to the emergency card.

If you are an Optimizely customer

Do this today, not this week. Open your project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code and read it; anything you did not write, and in particular any reference to 1688360.cc or an atob( call, is a reason to call Optimizely support and your developer. Review the users, API tokens, and integrations on the account and rotate them even though Optimizely says it has done so. If your own forms collected card details on November 16, treat those cards as exposed and talk to your payment processor about notification. And consider telling your customers before the news tells them for you; the organizations that come out of these incidents with trust intact are the ones who spoke first.

Keep the list current. The third-party script inventory belongs on the quarterly row of your maintenance calendar, next to the access review. The free Web Managers account at https://webmanagers.com/register includes the chapter worksheets and the maintenance calendar, the weekly Web Managers letter, and access to the courses; Chapter 8 of Strategic Web Management: First Steps for the Accidental Web Manager covers the rest of the security conversation this story belongs to.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the first thing to do when locked out of an account? Stop guessing passwords; repeated failures trigger provider lockouts that turn a fifteen-minute recovery into a multi-day one. Write down which account, what kind of lockout, and how urgent it honestly is.

What ends most lockouts quickly? Two boring doors: the second administrator, who can reset or re-invite you without the provider, and the password vault, which holds the credential, the backup codes, and the two-factor seed.

What evidence does support need to restore access? Past invoices with the account number, the last four digits of the card on file, proof of domain control, business registration or letterhead, and government identification if asked.

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Cybersecurity  Governance  Management  

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